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Justice Without Favor: Due Process and
Separation of Executive and Judicial
Powers in State Government
Separation of powers is a necessary "bulwark against tyranny"" in part
because allowing one branch to wield executive and judicial power would
impair the impartial administration of the laws.2 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment's due process clause' requires states to provide an impartial tribunal
for their citizens in criminal prosecutions. Therefore, due process analysis
should consider whether a state's institutional structure threatens the im-
partiality of the criminal tribunal by failing adequately to separate execu-
tive and judicial responsibilities. Under the Dreyer doctrine, however, fed-
eral courts may not subject a state's separation of powers schemes to due
process scrutiny.4
This Note challenges that doctrine. It disputes the Court's view that
federalism bars due process inquiry into the structure of state government,
proposes how courts might determine when a state violates due process by
too closely linking the executive and judicial functions, and concludes by
illustrating how that proposal might be applied.
1. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965).
2. See W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 127 (1965) (one of five
primary justifications for separation of powers is to "assure that the laws are impartially adminis-
tered"); M. RicrrER, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF MoNTESQuiEU 84-92 (1977) (guaranteeing im-
partial judge is one major justification for separation of powers).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Inadequate separation of legislative and judicial powers, or of
legislative and executive powers, in state governments may also pose due process problems. This Note
only considers cases of executive-judicial interlock, however, for two reasons. First, the Note's central
contention is that courts must replace the Dreyer doctrine with a rule allowing some judicial examina-
tion of the due process implications of a state's government structure. Since the federal courts have
often applied due process to state court proceedings, especially criminal proceedings, the executive-
judicial nexus is the weakest facet of Dreyer. Second, cases of legislative-judicial interlock pose very
different problems than cases of executive-judicial interlock. The problems of the former are often
akin to those caused by bills of attainder, see infra note 49.
4. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902).
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I. Co-GUARANTORS OF AN IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL:
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND DUE PROCESS
Fourteenth amendment jurisprudence has long considered state prac-
tices and procedures that endanger the fundamental right to an impartial
judge to violate due process. Classical legal theorists and the framers of
the Constitution recognized that inadequate separation of the executive
and judicial power posed a significant threat to judicial impartiality. This
section proposes, as a synthesis of these two ideas, that courts should con-
sider whether a state system of separation of powers threatens the federal
due process right to an impartial judge.
A. Due Process and the Impartial Judge
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment emphasized that due pro-
cess created a right to a "fair" and "impartial trial."' 5 That right has long
been held to be fundamental to due process,6 and the Court has repeatedly
held that an impartial judge is an indispensible component of that right.7
Indeed, that "neutrality requirement"' does more than guarantee a partic-
ular defendant an unbiased judge. It also forbids procedures that create a
"probability that prejudice will result"9 or the appearance that a judge is
5. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2899 (1866) (Senator Cowan stating due process
demands fair trial); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 152-153 (1871) (J. Garfield, participant in
39th Congress, observing Fourteenth Amendment demands impartial trial).
6. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (due process demands impartial tribu-
nal in civil and criminal cases); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1946) (due process creates
"right to a fair trial"); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (due process guarantees "fair
and enlightened system of justice"); see also R. BERGER, GovaRNmcEr By JuDiciARY 193-220
(1977) (due process forbids no more than punishment of anyone by unfair trial); J. ELY, DF.oc-
RACY AND DIsSTusT 19 (1980) (function of due process clause is to guarantee fair procedures).
7. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (due process demands hearing on probable cause to
detain by neutral, detached magistrate); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 62 (1972) (due
process demands "neutral and detached judge in the first instance"); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 453 (1971) (due process demands decision to issue search warrant be made by neutral and
detached magistrate); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (impartial decisionmaker "essen-
tial" to due process); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (right to impartial judge so basic
to due process that courts can never treat its infraction as harmless error); In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955) (invalidating trial before potentially biased judge because "a fair trial in a fair tribu-
nal is a basic requirement of due process"); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (due process de-
mands impartial judge).
8. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
9. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543 (1965) (due process violated when courtroom proceedings
televised, whether or not defendant could show tribunal prejudiced thereby); Turner v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 466 (1965) (due process violated when key witnesses serve as bailiffs for jury, whether or not
actual bias shown); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (juries simultaneously deciding admissi-




biased,1" whether or not a specific defendant can show the procedure actu-
ally biased the outcome in his particular case."
Like most due process safeguards, the right to an impartial judge as-
sumes special importance in criminal cases. The liberty interest has al-
ways received vigorous due process protection. 2 Furthermore, in an ad-
versarial system in which the government acts as prosecutor, stiff
procedural safeguards are necessary to shield the defendant from the
state. 
3
B. Separation of Executive and Judicial Powers: Guarantor of an Im-
partial Judge
Classical political theorists recognized that government structures that
do not sufficiently separate executive and judicial powers create a high
probability that the judge in a criminal suit will be biased. The executive,
as the branch accusing the defendant, naturally desires to convict him.
When the accusing branch can control or influence the judge, the judge's
ability to objectively weigh the prosecution's case is endangered.' The
10. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974) (appearance of impartiality requirement prohibits
trial before judge who previously held defendant in contempt); Marberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S.
455 (1971) (same); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice).
11. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (judge hearing own contempt charges violates due
process whether or not actual bias shown). See also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242
(1980) (neutrality requirement may bar trial before judge who has no actual bias); Connally v. Geor-
gia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (prohibiting paying justice of peace only when he or she issued search
warrant, whether or not actual bias shown); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972)
(prohibiting judge with pecuniary interest in fines collected by court from serving as judge, whether or
not defendant can show actual bias); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (same).
12. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25-27 (1981) (defendant's right to
counsel tied to risk trial poses to his or her personal freedom); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373
(1979) (trials leading to loss of liberty different in kind and meriting greater due process safeguards
than trials resulting in fines or threat of imprisonment); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 157 (1974)
(right to continued employment merits lesser protection than "elemental freedom from external re-
straint"); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (creating higher due process standard for prison
parole hearing than for administrative hearing where liberty interest not at stake).
13. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (since state employs resources at trial to convict
defendant, "shield" against state efforts necessary); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223-27
(1967) (adversary system of criminal justice requires that defendant have counsel present at crucial
points in criminal prosecution to defend against efforts of law enforcement machinery); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943) (society must guard against "overzealous" use of
prosecutorial force); see also Frankel, The Search for the Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L.
REv. 1031, 1032-40, 1052-59 (1975) (adversary system motivates state prosecutor to place far greater
value on obtaining conviction than on discovering truth).
This Note considers only the dangers of executive and judicial interlock in criminal cases, because
in most civil cases the executive has only a limited interest in the outcome. Obviously, that is not
always the case. See People ex rel. Saranac Land and Timber v. Supreme Court Extraordinary Term,
220 N.Y. 487, 116 N.E. 384 (1917) (Extraordinary Term of New York Supreme Court called by
Governor after plaintiff won three suits againit state for state lands). The argument advanced here
may apply to some civil cases, but this extension presents conceptual problems that go beyond the
scope of this Note.
14. See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 69-71 (T. Nugent trans., J. Pritchard ed.,
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classical theorists recognized this threat both when the executive influ-
ences the judiciary and when the judiciary controls the executive."5
The framers, also, feared these interrelated dangers and sought to avoid
them in the Constitution. Their reliance on separation of powers stemmed
from their belief that people are inherently self-serving and, therefore,
that citizens cannot depend on the virtue of their officials to safeguard
individual rights.16 The framers sought to create a state that "economizes
on virtue" 17 by dispersing power within the government, so that the self-
ish desires of individuals and branches would substitute "opposite and ri-
val interests" for "better motives."1"
Separation of judicial and executive powers is, accordingly, crucial. If
the judge can be "overpowered, awed or influenced" 9 by the executive, he
will not provide a "steady, upright and impartial"20 administration of the
laws, nor will he check tyrannical or arbitrary prosecutions."1 Conversely,
if the judge holds "the executive power, the judge might behave with all
the violence of an oppressor," and enforce the law with bias. 2 Therefore,
the framers sought to shelter the judiciary from undue executive influence
by giving judges life tenure2" and guaranteed compensation.
24
1952) (1st ed. Geneva 1748) (if executive controls judiciary, judge will decide cases on executive's
behalf); id. at 36-37 (if executive prosecutes or benefits from confiscation of criminal's property,
executive will be biased as judge and executive's ministers will lack requisite "indifference" to serve as
judges); J. SADLER, THE RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOM OR CUSTOMS OF OUR ANcEsTou s 87 (1st ed.
London 1649) (executive sitting as judge will judge case with bias); J. LsI~ouRNE, THE LAWES
FUNERALL 9 (1st ed. London 1648) (law-executors serving as judges leads to partiality in trials); J.
FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUs LEGUM ANGLIE, 127-31 (S. Chrimes trans. 1942) (1st ed. n.p., 1467-71)
(justice can only be done if judge chosen by king swears to do "justice without favour. . .though the
king should command him. . .to the contrary"); cf. R. ACHERILEY, THE BRITANNIC CONSTITUTION
86 (1st ed. London 1727) (if king exercised judicial power in criminal prosecutions he would be judge
and party and would enforce the law unfairly).
15. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 14, at 70 (judge will use executive power oppressively).
16. See J. ADAMS, Discourses on Davila, in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 232-35 (C. Adams
ed. 1851) (man's passion for distinction creates ambition, jealousy, vanity); THE F.DERAiuST No. 10,
(J. Madison) (man motivated by dictates of personal interest); id. No. 15 (A. Hamilton) (in state of
nature, man's actions do not conform to dictates of justice); T. JEFFERSON, Notes On The State of
Virginia, in 4 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 21 (P. Ford ed. 1904) ("Mankind soon learns to
make interested uses of every right and power which they possess, or may assume.").
17. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1013
(1984).
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (U. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1967); see also J. ADAMS,
Letter to Richard Henry Lee, 15 November 1775, in 4 J. ADAMS, supra note 16 at 186 (constitu-
tional separation of powers necessary to check human nature's tendency toward tyranny); A. HAMIL-
TON, Tully Essays, in 6 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 418 (H. Lodge ed. 1904) (constitu-
tion necessary to prevent demagogues using factions to gain power).
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1967).
20. Id. at 465.
21. Id. No. 47, at 303 (U. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1967) (quoting Montesquieu); see also
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (criticizing king for controlling judicial salary and tenure).
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303 (U. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1967) (quoting Montesquieu)
(emphasis omitted).
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
24. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1.
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The framers also believed, however, that complete separation of powers
is undesirable. An interlocking of the branches is necessary, so that the
branches, without having control over the acts of each other,25 can "by
their mutual relations be the means of keeping each other in their proper
places."2" Furthermore, while the framers emphasized the dangers of too
closely linking executive and judicial functions, they also acknowledged
that the article III safeguards are not the only means to preserve judicial
independence.27 The Federalist cited with approval state systems in which
judges held office for limited terms,2 8 were selected by the legislature, 29 or
were nominated by the executive and confirmed by an elected governor's
council. 30 To the framers, the critical question was whether a particular
method of arranging a government created a system in which the branches
checked each other, or whether it compromised the independence of a par-
ticular branch, thereby endangering the impartial administration of the
law.
C. Separation of Powers as a Requirement of Due Process
The Supreme Court has often invalidated state government structures
that endanger the due process rights to a fair trial and an impartial judge.
Accordingly, state jury procedures, systems for paying judges, and for
granting search warrants have been struck down, even though they were
not shown to have caused any specific injustice.31 Since systems that link
judicial and executive powers threaten the impartiality of the judicial tri-
bunal, the Fourteenth Amendment ought to require courts to consider
whether a given state structure separates the two powers sufficiently to
safeguard the individual's right to an impartial judge. The Supreme
Court, however, not only refuses to decide what constitutes "sufficient"
separation, but holds that federalism concerns preclude judicial inquiry
into state separation of powers schemes.
25. THE FEDERALST No. 47, at 302 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1967).
26. Id. No. 51, at 320 (J.Madison).
27. See id. No. 47, at 301-02 Ui. Madison) (Britain as example of separation of powers).
28. Id. at 307 (discussing Delaware and Pennsylvania constitutions); see DEL. CoNST. of 1776,
art. 17 (one-year term for "executive magistrate" sitting on highest court); PA. CONST. of 1776, § 23
(seven-year terms for supreme Court judges); cf. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 14, at 71 (espousing
short judicial terms).
29. THE FEDERALisT No. 47, at 306 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1967) (Delaware const.).
30. Id. at 306 (Pennsylvania const.).
31. See Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (paying justice of peace only if he issues search
warrants violates due process); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (state attorney
general issuing search warrants violates due process); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965)
(prosecution witnesses may not serve as bailiffs having charge of jury); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368 (1964) (jury may not decide both admissibility and weight of confession); Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510 (1927) (due process violated when judge receives portion of fines administered by his court).
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II. FEDERALISM AND DUE PROCESS SCRUTINY OF STATE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The Supreme Court has held that federalism bars due process scrutiny
into state separation of executive and judicial powers. This section argues
that federalism places limitations on that inquiry, but does not foreclose it.
A. The Dreyer Doctrine
The Supreme Court first held that due process did not impose separa-
tion of powers requirements upon the states in Dreyer v. Illinois.3 ' In
Dreyer, a prisoner argued that his due process rights were violated when
the Illinois State Board of Pardons, a part of the executive branch, made
the "judicial" decision that he did not qualify for release from prison. In
denying this claim, the Court declared that a state's determination of
whether its "legislative, executive and judicial powers ...shall be kept
altogether distinct and separate . . . cannot be an element in the inquiry
whether the due process of law prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment
has been respected by the State or its representatives."3'
The Court has not applied the doctrine to another case of an allegedly
inadequate separation of executive and judicial powers in a state criminal
system,"' but, in dicta, has repeatedly restated the Dreyer doctrine.35 Most
recently, the Court flatly observed: "[T]he doctrine of separation of pow-
ers embodied in the Federal Constitution is not mandatory on the
States."''
The doctrine has had a dramatic impact in state and lower federal
courts. Dreyer has long been read as establishing that "separation of
power principles do not apply to the States,' '1 and conclusory references
32. 187 U.S. 71 (1902).
33. Id. at 84.
34. The Supreme Court has commonly invoked doctrine to uphold state statutes delegating legis-
lative functions to judiciary. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.6
(1981) (state policy may be enunciated by courts and legislatures); Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339
U.S. 470, 479 (1950) (same); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 300, 303-04 (1934) (states
may give courts legislative powers); O'Donogue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 545-46 (1933)
(same); Keller v. Potomac Electric Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43 (1923) (same); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 225 (1908) (Virginia's state corporations commission's power to set electric
rates and enforce law against violators constitutional because state constitution can unite judicial and
legislative functions in single branch).
35. See Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 615 n.13 (1974)
("The Constitution does not impose on the States any particular plan for the distribution of govern-
mental powers."); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (noting that plaintiff had not
challenged constitutionality of state attorney general serving as investigatory committee of legislature,
but observing "the concept of separation of powers embodied in the United States Constitution is not
mandatory in state governments."); id. at 256-57 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The Constitution
does not impose on the states any particular plan for the distribution of governmental powers.").
36. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 n.4 (1979).
37. Caron v. United States, 548 F.2d 366, 367 (1st Cir. 1976); see also Parcell v. Kansas, 468 F.
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to the doctrine have served to refute arguments that the inadequate sepa-
ration of executive and judicial powers endangers due process.3 8 Accord-
ingly, these courts have rejected (with brief and uncritical restatements of
the Dreyer doctrine) allegations that federal due process is violated by
state systems that allow the Governor to select a judge to hear a case of
the Governor's choosing,39 that require the District Attorney's consent
before the judge can grant probation,40 that give the prosecutor power to
determine whether habitual criminals should receive enhanced sentences,41
and that confer subpoena power on prosecuting attorneys. 2
Surprisingly, considering the impact the doctrine has had, the Supreme
Court has provided little justification for it. In his concurring opinion in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire,43 Justice Frankfurter suggested the only justi-
fication for the Dreyer doctrine which any member of the Court has ever
advanced. Permitting due process inquiry into state separation of powers
arrangements, Frankfurter stated, would "make the deepest inroads upon
our federal system."44 Federalism, then, seems to be the barrier prevent-
ing due process inquiry from reaching state separation of powers
arrangements.
B. Federalism: How Strong an Objection?
Frankfurter's terse remark in Sweezy restates his broad view that Amer-
ican federalism consists of two distinct systems, one federal and one state,
each with its "proper domain,"45 and "distinctive operations" within its
"respective sphere."'46 Frankfurter's or any other theory of federalism
Supp. 1274, 1277 (D. Kan. 1979) ("States are not required to abide by the doctrine of separation of
powers."); LaGuardia v. Smith, 288 N.Y. 1, 41 N.E.2d 153, 176 Misc. 482, 485 (1941) ("[T]he
Federal authorities have no right to interfere with the States by way of requiring separation of powers
as necessary to . . .due process of law.") affld, 288 N.Y. 1, 41 N.E.2d 153 (1942).
38. See Bean v. Nevada, 410 F. Supp. 963, 966 (D. Nev. 1974) (state board of pardons, made up
of members of judicial and executive branches, not subject to due process challenge as violating sepa-
ration of powers); State ex rel. Lanier v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486, 494, 164 S.E.2d 161, 165-66 (1968)
("It is for the State to determine whether and to what extent its powers shall be kept separate between
the executive, legislative and judicial departments of its government," but relying on N.C Constitution
to reduce discretion of commissioner of insurance to fine insurance agenct who violate N.C. law).
39. People v. Davis, 67 Misc. 2d 14, 16, 322 N.Y.S.2d 927, 930-31 (S. Ct., Ontario Co. 1971)
(rejecting due process challenge to Extraordinary Term of N.Y. Supreme Court).
40. Chromiak v. Field, 406 F.2d 502, 504-05 (9th Cir. 1969) (California penal code provision
upheld), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970).
41. Martin v. Parratt, 412 F. Supp. 544, 548-49 (D. Neb. 1976) (upholding Nebraska habitual
criminal statute allowing prosecutors to seek mandatory enhanced sentences for habitual criminals),
aff'd, 549 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1977).
42. Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248, 255 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (Ark. statute not prima fade
unconstitutional), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 14 (1968).
43. 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1956).
44. Id. at 256.
45. Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 375 (1958).
46. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 490 (1944).
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should not, however, bar due process inquiry into a state's system of sepa-
ration of powers if that system threatens the federal right to an impartial
judge.
A state's decision to structure its government a certain way has never
been a "sacred province of state autonomy '47 into which the federal courts
could not pry. The ability of a state to structure its government has al-
ways been subject to federal constraints when the structure has endan-
gered the right to an impartial tribunal.4 At a minimum, for example,
article I, section 10's ban on state bills of attainder and ex post facto laws
seeks to guarantee an impartial tribunal by preventing an unfair "trial by
legislature" during periods when the legislature is moved by "sudden and
strong passions."4 The Fourteenth Amendment was "an expansion of
47. E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983).
48. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (guarantee clause) may imply some congressional, if not judicial,
intervention to separate powers in the states sufficiently to guarantee that states impartially administer
justice. Hamilton argued that an impartial judiciary was necessary to preserve "republican" govern-
ment. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465-72 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed). See also Ireland, An
Independent Judiciary, in LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY 428, 430 (S. Presser & J. Zainaldin eds.
1980). Recently, state courts have read separation of power requirements into the guarantee clause.
See Van Sickle v. Shanahan, 212 Kan. 426, 511 P.2d 223 (1973); State v. Lehtola, 55 Wis. 2d 494
(1972). But see In re Interrogatories Propounded by Senate Concerning House Bill 1078, 189 Cola.
1, 536 P.2d 308 (1975) (guarantee clause does not impose separation of powers upon states.
49. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at
282 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1967) (inadequate separation of legislative and judicial powers
poses such danger to "personal security and private rights" that Constitution should impose "addi-
tional fences against" bills of attainder). Article I, § 10 may mean more. See United States v. Brown,
381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965) (Article I's ban on federal bills of attainder general safeguard against
legislative exercise of judicial function). The Court has not yet read the ban on state bills of attainder
in a similar way. However, the broad reading traditionally given art. I, § 10, see Weaver v. Graham,
450 U.S. 24 (1981); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 137
(1810), and parallel language of ban on federal and state bills of attainder suggest that the Court will.
In fact, the dissent in Brown expressly argued that a broad reading of § 9 demanded an analogous
reading of § 10. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 473 (White, J. dissenting); see also L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN
CONsTrrTIONAL LAw 491-94 (1978) (bill of attainder clause demands separation of legislative and
judicial powers in states); Note, The Bounds of Legislative Specifications, A Suggested Approach to
the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330 (1972) (ban on bills of attainder is implementation of
separation of powers). But see Berger, Bills of Attainder: A Study of Amendment by the Court, 63
CORNELL L. REv. 355, 371, 379-82 (1978) (bill of attainder clause not meant to impose separation of
powers upon states).
Given that the framers considered separation of powers so important that they used the federal
Constitution to require partial separation of state legislative and judicial powers, one might ask why
they did not impose similar safeguards regarding the executive and judicial powers. The answer lies
in the framers' deference to states' rights. See Berger, supra; THE FEDERALIST Nos. 35 & 36 (U.
Madison). Federalism concerns were overridden, however, in the special case of bills of attainder
because the framers believed that in a republic the legislature was the most powerful branch and
therefore that many restraints on its power were necessary, see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,
442 (1965); THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 344 (U. Madison); Note, supra, at 343-48. Legislative-
judicial interlock was therefore more frightening to the framers than executive-judicial interlock. Fur-
thermore, the bill of attainder was the most obvious and easily identifiable form of inadequate separa-
tion of powers. No analogous form existed for executive-judicial interlock. This Note contends that the
federalism balance has been so radically altered by the Fourteenth Amendment and its subsequent
interpretation by the courts, that the framers' deference to states' rights can no longer protect execu-
tive-judicial interlock in state governments from due process scrutiny.
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federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty" which further lim-
ited states' freedom in structuring their governments.5" In fact, some
scholars believe the amendment was adopted to serve precisely that
purpose.51
Furthermore, the court has, without expressly recognizing it, severely
undermined the Dreyer doctrine by using the due process clause to bar
egregious mergers of executive and judicial powers in which a single offi-
cial wears both the executive and judicial hats in a criminal prosecution.
Two cases, Tumey v. Ohio5" and Ward v. Village of Monroeville,53 held
that systems under which a town mayor, serving as judge, assessed fines
that were paid into the town treasury violated the due process clause. A
third case, In re Murchison," recognized that allowing a judge to assume
an executive role can also endanger due process. The Court declared un-
constitutional a Michigan procedure that allowed a judge to decide con-
tempt charges he himself had brought on the grounds that the judge was
serving in "his own case" by, in effect, assuming prosecutorial and judicial
roles. 55
The Court never discussed the separation of powers implications of
these decisions. Nor did it ever take the logical step of expanding these
"two-hat" cases to situations in which one branch controls both executive
and judicial functions. And, of course, it never recognized that the two-hat
cases are an exception to the Dreyer doctrine. These cases do, however,
50. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980); see also cases discussed supra note
31; Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (provision of Louisiana constitution allowing conviction
by non-unanimous jury violates due process); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975) (North Dakota
constitution contained impermissible provisions for allocating seats in legislature); Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (provision of Louisiana constitution requiring jury trial only in some crimi-
nal cases violates due process); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (Alabama Constitution's sys-
tem of allocating seats in state legislature violates equal protection clause).
51. See R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 22-26 (Fourteenth Amendment passed to make Civil Rights
Act of 1866's intervention in state voting procedures constitutional); Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause
of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513, 546 (1962)
(Fourteenth Amendment introduced to add to Congress' power over states under the Guarantee
Clause).
52. 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (due process bans mayor from judging suits because of mayor's "parti-
san" interest in filling town treasury and because portion of fines were added to mayor's salary); see
also Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928) (mayor holding virtually no executive power lacks partisan
interest in suit and so can serve as judge).
53. 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (due process bans mayor from judging traffic violation suits because of
mayor's partisan interest in fining defendants to fill town treasury); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 125 (1975) (judicial officer must carry out probable cause hearing); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (state attorney general cannot issue search warrants).
54. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
55. Id. at 136; see also Figueroa Ruiz v. Delgado, 359 F.2d 718 (1st Cir. 1966) (judge interrogat-
ing witnesses in absence of prosecuting attorney violates due process); United States v. James, 440 F.
Supp. 1137 (D. Md. 1977) (judge presenting government case in traffic violation suit violates due
process); Wounded Knee v. Andera, 416 F. Supp. 1236 (D.S.D. 1976) (Sioux tribal court in which
judge serves as prosecutor violates due process); Haley v. Troy, 338 F. Supp. 794, 804 (D. Mass.
1972) (judge hearing cases of plaintiffs whom he coerced into filing suit violates due process).
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demonstrate that state government structure is not inherently insulated
from federal due process scrutiny.
It might be argued that the level of federal intervention proposed by
this Note is so much greater in degree than that allowed in the two-hat
cases that federalism bars it as different in kind. Under the Warren and
Burger courts' interpretations of the due process clause, however, federal
courts have intervened as intrusively in regulating how states administer
criminal justice as anything proposed here.56 Currently, for example, due
process not only requires states to provide jury trials in criminal cases,
57
but also determines how few jurors there may be5 and how they should
be chosen.59 It demands that states provide lawyers to indigents,60 law
libraries to prisoners,6 ' judicial probable-cause hearings to detainees,62
and Miranda warnings to subjects of "custodial interrogation." 3 In the
name of due process the Court has established standards states must fol-
low when carrying out police searches" or pre-trial identifications,65 issu-
ing search warrants, 6 and imposing the death penalty.67 Furthermore,
56. For evidence that the Burger court has maintained the Warren court's willingness to restruc-
ture state governments, see cases cited infra notes 56-69; see also Salzburg, Foreword: The Flow and
Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEo L.J. 151
(1980) (Burger Court has, overall, affirmed Warren court's tendency to impose defendant-protecting
procedures upon state and federal law enforcement agencies).
57. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975) (due process demands state provide jury
trial for "serious" crime); Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974) (due process demands state
provide jury trial for crime punishable by over six-month imprisonment); Baldwin v. New York, 399
U.S. 66 (1970) (same); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (due process demands state provide
jury trial in criminal cases).
58. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (state conviction by non-unanimous six-person
jury violates due process); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (state conviction by jury of less
than six people violates due process).
59. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (due process requires that state choose jurors
from representative cross-section of community); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (same);
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (requiring state judge to ask voir dire questions on
racial prejudice).
60. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (due process requires state to provide counsel
to indigents); see also Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (state cannot use uncounseled mis-
deamenor conviction to elevate subsequent conviction to felony); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)
(state must provide counsel in any suit leading to imprisonment); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972) (same); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (state must provide counsel at sentencing
hearing); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (same).
61. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
62. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200
(1979) (state must provide probable cause hearing whether or not state defines detention at issue as
arrest).
63. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)
(presumption against admission of statement made after defendant requested attorney); Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (banning use of state pretrial psychiatric examination obtained without
Miranda warnings in sentencing hearing); Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980) (per curiam)
(state may not presume defendant knowingly waived Miranda rights).
64. See Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
65. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
66. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
67. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (Ohio death penalty statute violates due
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once a provision of the bill of rights is found to be fundamental to the
American scheme of justice, it is applied to the states exactly as it is en-
forced against the federal government.68 The Court has rejected any sug-
gestion that federalism waters down the procedural safeguards that the
incorporated provision imposes on the states.69
Federalism does, however, place some limits on how federal courts can
enforce federal rights. Since the Supreme Court lacks supervisory power
over the state courts, it can only impose constitutionally-dictated rules on
the states.7 0 Accordingly, state constitutional provisions are deemed viola-
tive of the federal constitution only to the extent necessary to protect fed-
eral constitutional rights; the method of federal intrusion should be as
process by excluding individualized consideration of defendant's character and record); Coker v. Geor-
gia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty for rape violates due process); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976) (mandatory death penalty for first-degree murder violates due process); Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242 (1976) (state capital sentencing procedure requiring jury to weigh variety of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances upheld); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (same).
68. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-13 (1975) (applying standards for federal probable
cause hearings to states); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) (applying federal double jeopardy
standards to states); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (same); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514 (1972) (applying federal right to speedy trial to states); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970)
(applying federal standards for unreasonable search and seizure to states); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969) (same); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (same); Griffen v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965) (applying federal self-incrimination standards to states); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964) (same); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (applying federal standards of the right to
confront adverse witnesses to states).
69. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 30 (5th ed.
1980); Israel, Criminal Procedure, The Burger Court and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1320, 1327, 1330-31 (1977); Nowak, Due Process Methodology in the Post Incorpo-
ration World, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 397, 398-400 (1979); Wilkes, The New Federalism
in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 424 (1974)
(selective incorporation doctrine still unchallenged by Burger Court). Justice Harlan repeatedly ad-
vanced the argument that federalism requires that the Constitution impose a lesser standard of protec-
tion of incorporated rights on states than that imposed on the federal government, see Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 117-38 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting in part); Griffen v. Cali-
fornia, 380 U.S. 609, 615-17 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring), but it was never accepted by the Court.
Apadoca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (unanimous jury verdict not constitutionally mandated) is
not contra. Eight justices agreed that the federal standard should apply to the states, but disagreed on
what that standard was. Nor is Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-74 (1979) (since states regulate
broader range of human conduct than does federal government, practicality, not federalism, may jus-
tify less stringent application of the right to counsel to certain state prosecutions than that applied to
federal prosecutions). To the extent the Burger Court has limited Warren Court decisions, it has
loosened controls on federal and state criminal enforcement equally. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S.
765 (1983) (weakening search and seizure standard but assuming application of federal standards to
states); Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982) (same); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981) (same); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (same); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492
(1977) (per curiam) (narrowing Miranda requirements but assuming requirements apply equally to
federal and state governments); Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (same); Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433 (1974) (same); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (same).
70. See Ristano v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 n.9 (1976) (although Constitution does not require
voir dire on racism in all interracial cases, Court would require it in federal courts); Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972) (Court can only impose constitutionally-mandated rules on states); McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943) (Court's supervisory authority over federal criminal
procedure exceeds its control over state procedure).
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unobtrusive as possible."' The Court, in restructuring state governments
under the due process clause has, therefore, only occasionally imposed a
per se rule72 or a specific procedure upon the states. 3 In most cases, it has
defined a broad standard the states must meet, and allowed the states to
devise procedures to meet that standard.7 4 In revising the Dreyer doctrine
to allow federal courts to condemn specific allocations of executive and
judicial powers, the Court would be creating such a broad standard. It
would not demand federal court supervision of the daily functioning of
state criminal procedures; it would only require that states devise new
ways of distributing their powers. States would continue to prosecute, con-
vict and punish criminals. To paraphrase the Court's observation last
year, the proposed federal action requires states to accomplish their func-
tions in a more careful manner than would otherwise be the case, but it
does not require them to abandon those functions. 5
III. DUE PROCESS SCRUTINY OF SEPARATION OF EXECUTIVE AND
JUDICIAL POWERS IN STATE GOVERNMENT
Because federalism limits, but does not bar, due process scrutiny of state
separation of powers schemes, Dreyer should be replaced by an approach
that safeguards the right to an impartial judge, yet respects state sover-
71. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 584 (1964). Cf. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502
(1974) (denying injunctive relief to plaintiffs who alleged they might be subjected to discriminatory
enforcement of law by state judge); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-80 (1976) (denying injunctive
restructuring of Philadelphia police department); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (denying
injunction against use of chokeholds by Los Angeles police department). It must be emphasized that
these cases turn on limitations of federal equity jurisdiction. See O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 499-500; Rizzo,
423 U.S. at 372-380; Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101. While holding that federalism constrained that jurisdic-
tion, they also emphasized that alternate federal remedies limited the official action at issue. See
O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 503-504; Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111-12.
72. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (per se rule against increase of
defendant's sentence after appeal and reconviction unless judge justifies increase with reasons relating
to objective conduct of defendant); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (per se exclusion of
evidence from past indictment lineup at which defendant lacked counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (per se rule against conviction of indigent defendant lacking counsel); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (per se exclusion of evidence procured by illegal search).
73. See, e.g., California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (per curiam) (Miranda warnings not
required if "fully effective" equivalent is given); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (Miranda
warnings are prophylactic standards designed to safeguard due process rights).
74. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (magistrate must look to "totality of circum-
stances" when deciding whether to issue search warrant); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975)
(states must provide "fair and reliable determination of probable cause [by judicial officer] as a condi-
tion for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty"); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967)
(state identification procedures may not be "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable
mistaken identification"); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196 (1972) (same); Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514 (1972) (states must provide speedy trial, but courts will look to length of delay, reason for
delay, defendant's assertion of his right and prejudice to defendant in determining whether that right
has been denied).
75. E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 239 (1983) (holding that federalism does not bar Con-
gress from applying age-discrimination legislation to state government).
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eignty. This section proposes such an approach and illustrates how it
might be applied.
A. The Proposal
Separation of powers doctrine identifies several interrelated characteris-
tics of a state system that adequately separates executive and judicial pow-
ers. The system will economize on virtue by relying on fair procedures,
rather than on honest office holders, to ensure that the executive lacks the
ability unduly to influence the judiciary.
78
The analysis in the "two-hat" cases explains what constitutes "undue
influence." In Tumey v. Ohio 77 the Court first stated that "[e]very proce-
dure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a
judge. . .not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State
and the accused, denies the latter due process of law,"178 then forcefully
observed that "[a] situation in which an official perforce occupies two
practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other
judicial, necessarily involves a lack of due process of law in the trial of
defendants charged with crimes before him."
'79
Separation of powers doctrine suggests the court must look to a complex
set of factors to determine whether a specific state structure generates un-
due influence under the two-hat analysis. At the outset, the court must
examine the nature of the interrelationship of the executive and judicial
branches. The entwining of the two may simply realize the goal of separa-
tion of powers doctrine, that each branch have the means of checking the
other. On the other hand, the interlock may be so tight that the judge is
no longer an outsider impartially observing the executive's case, but has
absorbed the executive's interest in conviction. The interlock may also
pose due process dangers by granting the executive so much power over
the judiciary that the executive can dictate or influence the judge's
decision.
Second, the court must determine whether these shortcomings are seri-
ous enough to violate due process. In determining whether the state struc-
ture tempts the average person as judge sufficiently to render the balance
between state and defense no longer "nice, clear and true," the court must
76. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
77. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
78. Id. at 532.
79. Id. at 534. The average-person standard does not conflict with situations in which judges are
assumed to have more than the average person's ability to remain objective, such as after disallowing
prejudicial evidence, or after guilty pleas have been withdrawn. In such cases, the judge is under no
direct institutional pressure to decide the case on the executive's behalf. Furthermore, in some cases
objectivity can be learned. The judge, for example, can remain objective after disallowing prejudicial
evidence because he has learned to recognize the non-probative value of such evidence.
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determine whether the relationship between the branches is likely to bias
the judge in actual cases.80 This requires that the branch of the executive
influencing the judge have a partisan interest in the outcome of the trial.
Just as in other due process inquiries, however, the Court does not need
to find actual bias in any specific case. The determination that a particu-
lar procedure creates a possibility of bias would be sufficient to establish
its unconstitutionality.
Admittedly, due process scrutiny of state separation of executive and
judicial powers may require a difficult weighing of competing factors. But
it requires no more weighing than most other due process inquiries and
certainly no more than the "two-hat" analysis already applied in Tumey,
Ward and Murchison."1 Although the boundaries of constitutionally per-
missible state structures are broad, they are not limitless. Courts must
police those limits.
B. The Standard Applied
The most significant advantage of overruling Dreyer is that potentially
dangerous state systems, perhaps as yet undeveloped, can be subjected to
due process scrutiny. The result in Dreyer, however, would not change.
Though the Illinois State Board of Pardons was technically an executive
body that decided whether a prisoner should be released, 2 it had no parti-
san interest in the outcome of the hearing, nor was it alleged to be subject
to influence from any individual who did.8" Other state structures, how-
80. The test to determine when inadequate separation of powers poses due process problems in
administrative agencies, see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (court should assume honesty
of those serving as adjudicators and require defendant to prove absence of separation of powers poses
due process problems), should not be applied to separation of powers in state criminal procedures for
four reasons. First, the courts have not applied the Withrow standard outside of the administrative
context, see Hortonville Joint School District No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, .491
(1976). Second, liberty rights at stake in criminal proceedings merit higher due process protection
than rights at stake in administrative cases. See supra note 12. Third, administrative agency cases
involve a combination of investigative and adjudicative functions, not a linking of partisan and judicial
roles. See Hortonville, 426 U.S. 482 (school board investigates and punishes striking teachers);
Withrow, 421 U.S. 35 (examining board of physicians investigates and can revoke licence of physi-
cian); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison disciplinary committee investigates and pun-
ishes prisoner misbehavior); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (regional office of Office of
Economic Opportunity investigates and institutes removal of federal employee); Fourth, availability of
de novo judicial review of administrative decisions lowers the due process standard applicable to ad-
ministrative agencies. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 679-80 (1977) (subsequent judicial
remedy sufficient to safeguard rights of child punished in schools).
81. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
82. 187 U.S. 71, 79-83 (1902).
83. Similar argument reinforces the court's holding in Bean v. Nevada, 410 F. Supp. 963 (D.C.
Nev. 1974) (state board of pardons made up of executive and judicial branches not subject to due
process challenge as violating separation of powers). The board was not alleged to have a "partisan"
interest in the outcome of its adjudication. Furthermore, in Bean, executive control over the decision
was tempered by judicial presence on the board.
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ever, which have been protected by the Dreyer doctrine would fare less
well.8"
1. Executive Power Over the Judiciary
Systems of executive selection and removal of judges potentially raise
serious problems,85 but most states that place the selection and removal
powers in executive hands structure the procedure so as to reduce the
executive's ability to influence or control the judiciary.86 Most such states
require the legislature or an elected "governor's council" to approve the
judges nominated by the governor.8" Furthermore, the judges' lengthy
84. The Arkansas statute upheld in Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Ark.) aff d, per
curiam, 393 U.S. 14 (1969), which conferred subpoena power upon prosecuting attorneys, would fail
the test. The attorney would naturally be prone to make a biased decision as to whether a given
document was relevant to his investigation. The California Penal Code provision requiring approval
by the prosecuting attorney before judge can grant probation, upheld in Chromiak v. Fields, 406 F.2d
502 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970), has been repealed by the California legisla-
ture, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (West 1982). It would probably also fall under the proposed
standard. The executive interest in sentencing is not as pronounced as the executive interest in convic-
tion. Nonetheless, the executive's adversarial relationship with the defendant might bias the attorney
toward demanding strict sentences for convicted defendants. Similarly, the Nebraska statute upheld in
Martin v. Parratt, 412 F. Supp. 544, 549 (D.C. Neb. 1976) (Nebraska habitual criminal statute
allowing prosecutors to seek mandatory enhanced sentences for habitual criminals) would survive only
if it left prosecutors minimal discretion to decide whether to bring the fact that the criminal was a
habitual offender to the attention of the judge. Under the Nebraska law, once the judge knew the
defendant was a habitual offender, the sentence was mandatory.
85. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, (A. Hamilton) (greatest threat to separation of powers posed
when one branch has power to appoint and remove members of another branch).
A test analogous to the one proposed here would not invalidate state systems of elected judiciaries,
though such an outcome would satisfy many scholars who argue that elected judiciaries pose due
process problems. See A. STuRM, THIRTY YEARS OF STATE CONSTrrUTION-MAKING: 1938-68
(1970); Elliot, Essential Elements of a Model Judiciary Article, in INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN-
ISTRATION: SELECTED SPECIAL STUDIES (1959). Elected judiciaries should be distinguished from fu-
sions of executive and judicial powers on several grounds. First, the electorate does not hold a "parti-
san" interest in convicting a particular defendant. If the electorate were essentially deciding a case by
referendum, or if the judge ran on a platform of convicting a particular defendant, most agree that due
process problems would arise. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 494-95 (1978).
Second, most systems of elected judiciaries have extensive safeguards to prevent popular pressures
biasing the judge. The Missouri system, adopted by the majority of states with elected judiciaries,
requires nomination of a list of candidates for judges' positions by a legislative committee, a selection
of the nominee by the governor, and confirmation by the people. See A. STURM, MODERNIZING
STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1973). Third, the people are the source of power in state constitutions.
Their decision to directly elect their officers carries much weight. It is far less likely that the people
are aware of the specific intermingling of executive and judicial powers developed by their state gov-
ernments. Fourth, long usage supports elected judiciaries. Most state governments, on the other hand,
do not entwine the executive and judicial powers so as to endanger the due process right to an impar-
tial tribunal. The institutional pressures against changing the system of elected judiciaries are, there-
fore, far more pronounced than the pressures supporting judicial and executive merger. See Love, The
Election ofJudges by the People for Short Terms of Office, in LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY, supra
note 48, at 437; see also Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138 (1979) (uniform judgment of nation
as expressed through state procedures provides useful guide to what practices are constitutionally
permissible).
86. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and
New York have some form of executive appointment of judges. See infra notes 87-89.
87. CONN. CONST. art. V., § 2 (governor appoints judges with approval of general assembly);
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terms8 8 and the requirement that the legislature initiate judicial impeach-
ment proceedings89 further reduce executive influence.
New York, however, creates a system of executive appointment of
judges, which, though it has been upheld in reliance on Dreyer,9" raises
serious due process problems. The New York Constitution allows the
Governor to select the judge to hear a specific case at a specific time. 1
The Governor's decision to hold the Extraordinary Term, his selection of
the case to be heard, and of the judge to hear it, are not reviewable. 2
Executive selection of judges for specific cases bypasses the safeguards
against bias, such as legislative oversight of the Governor's decision and
lengthy judicial terms, found in other state systems. The Governor has the
ability to influence the outcome of the case by selecting a judge who will
handle it the way the Governor wishes. The fact that the Governor se-
lected a specific case for adjudication suggests he may hold a partisan in-
terest in the outcome. Indeed, the cases decided by Extraordinary Terms
in New York have been sensational murders,93 investigations into official
corruption, 94 or similar cases in which the state has a peculiar interest
over and above its ordinary concern in criminal cases. Allegations of judi-
cial bias in cases heard in Extraordinary Terms are common. 5 Even if
DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (governor appoints with advice and approval of senate); HAWAII CONST.
art. V, § 3 (same); N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, cl. I (same); ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 8 (judicial
officers nominated and appointed by Governor with advice and consent of governor's council); N.H.
CONST. pt. II, art. 46 (same); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. II, § 1, art. 9 (same).
88. CONN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (eight-year term for superior and circuit courts); DEL CONST. art.
IV, § 3 (twelve-year terms); HAWAII CONST. art. V, § 3 (ten-year terms); ME. CONST. art. VI, § 4
(seven-year terms); MAss. CONST. pt. 2, ch. III, art. I (good behavior); N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 73
(good behavior); N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, cl. 3 (seven-year terms for supreme and superior court
judges, extended to good behavior after reappointment).
89. CONN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (judge impeached by legislature); DEL CONST. art. III, § 12
(same); ME. CONsT. art. VI, § 4 (same); N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, T4 (same); HAWAII CONST. art.
V, § 4 (board established by legislature recommends removal to executive who appoints second board
to investigate; if second board recommends dismissal, executive dismisses judge); N.H. CONST. pt. II,
art. 73 (removal by Governor with consent of Council upon address of both houses, except in case of
advanced age or mental or physical incompetence, in which case governor may remove judge on his
own authority; no record of this potentially dangerous power being abused); MAss. CONST. Pt. II, ch.
III, art. 1 (same).
90. See People v. Davis, 67 Misc. 2d 14, 16, 322 N.Y.S. 2d 927, 930 (S. Ct., Ontario Co. 1971).
91. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 27.
92. Cunningham v. Nadjari, 39 N.Y.2d 314, 347 N.E.2d 915, 383 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1976); People
ex rel. Saranac Land and Timber v. Extraordinary Term, 220 N.Y. 487, 116 N.E. 384 (1917).
93. People v. Gillette, 191 N.Y. 107, 83 N.E. 680 (1908) (nephew of factory owner seduces
uncle's employee, refuses to marry her, clubs her to death with tennis racquet while on boating trip);
People v. Shea, 147 N.Y. 78, 41 N.E. 505 (1895) (defendant and group of political allies murder poll-
watcher who tried to stop them from voting illegally). Gillette was the basis for T. DREISER, AN
AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1925).
94. See United States ex rel. Monty v. McQuillan, 385 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Dondi v.
Jones, 40 N.Y.2d 8, 351 N.E.2d 650, 386 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1976); People v. Neff, 191 N.Y. 167, 83 N.E.
970 (1908)(investigations of corruption by state officials); cf. People ex rel. Saranac Land and Timber
v. Extraordinary Term, 220 N.Y. 487, 116 N.E. 384 (1917) (Extraordinary Term called after plain-
tiff won three suits against state for state lands).
95. See Pitler, Superseding the District Attorneys in New York City-The Constitutionality and
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the allegations are unfounded, they suggest that the system creates the
possibility and appearance of bias. This appearance of bias, together with
the risk that inadequate separation of executive and judicial powers will
allow the Governor, holding a partisan interest in the outcome of the suit,
to exercise sufficient control over the judiciary to bias a judge, suggests
that the Term violates due process."
2. Judicial Control Over the Executive
Judicial involvement in the prosecution of a case can also give a judge a
partisan role in a criminal suit. Connecticut's recently reformed system of
states' attorneys was a case in point, which, under the Dreyer doctrine,
was shielded from due process scrutiny. 7
Until 1984 the Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court ap-
pointed the Chief State's Attorney. 8 The judges of the superior court ap-
Legality of Executive Order No. 55, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 517, 544 n.162 (1972) (judicial bias
apparent in Extraordinary Term handling of investigation into corruption in N.Y. City police depart-
ment); Cunningham v. Nadjari, 39 N.Y.2d 314, 347 N.E.2d 915, 383 N.Y.S. 2d 590 (1976) (plain-
tiff's contention that Extraordinary Term was granting subpoenas to harass defendant and manipulate
public events and media plausible).
96. New York and federal courts have upheld the New York system. See People ex. rel. Saranac
Lake Land and Timber v. Extraordinary Term, 220 N.Y. 487, 116 N.E. 384, 385 (1917) (Extraordi-
nary Term necessary because Governor might need to call session for reasons of public welfare which
courts could not know); United States ex rel. Monty v. McQuillan, 385 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D.N.Y.
1974) (upholding Term on ground that defendant does not have due process right to randomly se-
lected judge, but not discussing pressures toward bias in New York system); cf. Mulroy v. Carey, 58
A.D.2d 207, 396 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1977) (Extraordinary Term does not create risk of unconstitutional
influence over the prosecution), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 819, 373 N.E.2d 369, 402 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1977).
97. Connecticut courts have upheld the statute in the face of separation of powers and due process
challenges. State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 569-70, 325 A.2d 199, 206-07 (1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 976 (1974), asserted that the system functioned effectively for 270 years with no prejudice to
those accused of criminal offenses, id. at 570, 325 A.2d at 207, and found no violation of Connecticut
Constitution art. II (requiring separation of powers in state government) because state's attorneys are
officers of the court, whose role is to see that impartial justice is done, id. at 569, 325 A.2d at 206.
Neither of the Court's arguments is persuasive. First, its assertion that the accused have not been
prejudiced by the Connecticut system is belied by studies of the system. See CrTZENS CRIME COM-
MISSION OF CONNECTICUT, REPORT ON THE PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTION 4-5 (1984) (Connecticut
judges biased by system of selecting prosecutors); Newman, Prosecutor and Defender Reform: Reor-
ganization to Increase Effectiveness, 44 CONN. B. J. 567, 569 (1970) (Connecticut judges determine
how cases will be pleaded over better judgment of prosecutors and defense). Second, in an adversarial
system the prosecutors, though technically officers of the court, have an overriding interest in convict-
ing defendants. See supra note 12. Furthermore, the issue is whether the judge is biased by being too
closely tied to the prosecuting function, so the status of prosecutors as "officers of the court" begs the
question. See also Moynahan v. Manson, 419 F. Supp. 1139 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd 559 F.2d 1204
(2d. Cir. 1977); Connecticut v. DiLeo, 28 Conn. Supp. 354, 261 A.2d 547 (1969) (relying on Moyna-
han to uphold Connecticut system); cf United States v. Richmond, 277 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1960) (no
due process violation arises when the judge selects public defenders). The Richmond situation is not
analogous to judicial selection of prosecutors because: (a) the due process requirement that defendants
receive a fair trial suggests that judicial bias in favor of a criminal defendant is less serious than bias
against a defendant; and (b) judicial selection of a defender implements a constitutional right to coun-
sel. No constitutional right is involved in judicial selection of a prosecutor.
98. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-278 (b) (1) (West Supp. 1982). In November 1984, Connecti-
cut amended its constitution to provide that a Criminal Justice Commission, selected by the Governor
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pointed the state's attorneys for their judicial districts,"9 determining how
many assistants the states' attorneys needed, appointing deputy and assis-
tant states attorneys to fill that need, 100 setting the deputies, and assist-
ants' salaries, reappointing the attorneys after their four year terms, 101
and, through a committee of Superior Court judges, removing the attor-
neys from office when necessary.10 2
The opportunity for judges in this system to become too closely involved
in the prosecution is obvious. The extent to which judges actually did so
was a subject of much debate in Connecticut."0 It has been suggested that
under the Connecticut system the judge in effect decided what cases would
be brought and how they would be pleaded.'" To the extent this was
true, the judges had become intimately involved in the prosecution's case.
Such intimate involvement creates the possibility that the judge would no
longer be able to view that case with an impartial, detached eye. It
thereby violated due process.
CONCLUSION
This Note provides a way to subject dangerous state systems such as
New York's Extraordinary Term and Connecticut's judicial appointment
of prosecutors to due process scrutiny. Courts should not dismiss difficult
due process problems posed by inadequate separation of judicial and exec-
utive powers in state government with short, uncritical references to
Dreyer. Separation of powers principles flow naturally into the current of
modern due process analysis. The Supreme Court should allow their
merger by providing for due process review of state separation of execu-
tive and judicial functions in criminal prosecutions.
-David A. Martland
and confirmed by the legislature, would select State's Attorneys. Three Changes Supported by Voters,
HARTFORD CouRArr, Nov. 7, 1984, at A20.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. § 51-278 (b)(2)(B)-(C).
102. Id. § 51-278 (b)(5).
103. See CmzENs CRIME COMMISSION, supra note 97, at 1 (consensus in Connecticut govern-
ment that procedure for selecting states attorneys must be modified).
104. Newman, supra note 97, at 569; CrrizEus CRIME COMMISSION, supra note 97, at 4 (judge
biased by Connecticut system).
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